Approved For Release 2007/11/15 : CIA-RDP85M00363R000400690038-6	1
TOP SECRET	
IRAN'S LIKELY REACTION TO IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS	
4 November 1983	
Summary	
Iraq has used both lethal and non-lethal chemical weapons against the Iranians during the war. Non-lethal CS (tear gas) has contributed to Iraqi success in defending against massed infantry assaults. Mustard agent, the only chemical warfare agent used by the Iraqis, has been used only recently. It has been generally less effective than the Iraqis had hoped although it has caused some Iranian military and civilian casualties. The Iraqis are producing additional mustard agent, but we doubt they are capable of producing enough to significantly affect the outcome of the righting.	25X1
Iran is unlikely to be deterred from pursuing the war because of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. If the Iraqis are able to employ mustard agent more effectively, Iran will be forced to adjust its military tactics and acquire additional protective gear but it will continue to launch attacks on Iraq. We have no evidence that Iran has lethal chemical agents or that it is making an effort to acquire any. If Iraqi use of mustard agent improves we would expect Iran to seek sources of lethal chemical agents. Iran has publicly condemned Iraqi use of chemical weapons and is seeking evidence to present to the UN. Even a strong international condemnation of Iraq for using mustard agent is unlikely to cause Iraq to cease employing it.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Background	
The first large-scale use of non-lethal chemical agents by the Iraqis occurred in July 1982 near Basrah during the initial Iranian invasion of Iraq. The Iraqis used mortar rounds loaded with CS (tear gas) to break up at least one Iranian infantry	05)//
The tear gas was effective, because Iranian forces were surprised and had not taken the necessary defensive	25X1 25X1
precautions	25X1 25X1
25X1	25X1
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			25X1
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		·	
Although Iraq r	eportedly has possess	sed mustard agent for	
over a year, we beli	eve Baghdad initially.	used it during fighting	
in Iraqi Kurdistan i	n July 1983. After I	ranian forces captured	
the small Iraqi army	outpost at Haj Umrar	y Baghdad ordered a	
	ake a key mountain ov		
	epeated attacks failed		
	he use of mustard age		
defenses.		50 250-kilogram	25 <b>X</b>
		along with tear gas to	
enable Iraqi command	los to retake the moun	tain. Senior Iraqi	
chemical warfare off	icers, however, repor	tedly criticized the	
employment of mustar	d agent, because they	felt faulty control	
		s and because its use	051/4
risked international	. condemnation.		25 <b>X</b> 1
	·	ILLEGIB	25X1
		ders were authorized to	
use mustard agent ag	gain in October during	the Iranian attack	$_{-}$ ILLEGII
toward the Iraqi tow			
	s of the battle, Iraq		
		ry of mustard agent in	
an accempt to stop t	and dispersed their	The Iranians reportedly orces into small groups	ILLEGIB
	Nevertheless, some		
	isters and blindness		5X1
Iranians have died a	is a result of the mos	t recent chemical	)/\ I
attacks	s a result or the mos	st recent chemical	
accaons			
Baghdad reporte	dly has been unable t	o keen up with the	
demand from units at	the front for additi	onal mustard agent.	
		produce only about 1,000	25 <b>X</b> 1
pounds of mustard ag		rtedly plans to try to	20/(1
purchase automatic 1	oaders from Italy to	permit more rapid	
	into artillery round		25X1
	Control of the Contro	Mark Billion - All All College	25 <b>X</b> 1
<u> Iranian Reaction</u>			
			25 <b>X</b> 1
			20/(1
Makana bha Taran			
		e their use of mustard	
is not likely to go	ly as they become mor	e familiar with itIran	
	k lethal chemical wea arge new supplies of		
		mustard agent, they nian troops and towns	
near the border. If	used in large quarti	ties over a small area,	
the weapons probably	would create a large	number of Transac	
casualties and more	importantly, could a	ffect Tranian troop	
morale. Thus far th	importaintry, could a	LIECL ILANIAN LEOON	
LILLO LUL UII	e Tradis annear to ha	ve used the weapon	
haphazardly, with in	e Iraqis appear to ha sufficient safety pre	ve used the weapon	25X1

25X1

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We believe a major, successful Iraqi chemical warfare attack on Tehran's troops would cause the Iranians to search for their own source of chemical weapons. This, however, would be a long-term prospect unless supplies were forthcoming from abroad.
We do not believe that effective Iraqi use of mustard agent would force Iran to end the war. Indeed, it is likely to make Tehran even more determined to continue the fighting and reinforce Khomeini's perception that peace with Saddam Husayn is impossible.
Instead, we would expect Iran to adjust its tactics to account for Iraq's more effective use of mustard agent. Most Iranian soldiers could be protected from the lethal affects of the weapon by wearing protective masks and clothing. Iranian army units have protective masks but we are unaware of how well these are distributed to personnel in the field. The Iranians already have implemented dispersal tactics to limit casualties, and we would expect these tactics to be refined and used regularly if the Iraqis increase use of mustard agent.
If the attacks persisted, Iran would likely escalate its response. Tehran would see such a quantum improvement as beyond Baghdad's capability and requiring the aid of an outside power, presumably the US or France. Its response, therefore, might be directed not only at the Iraqis, but also at US or French targets in the Middle East or the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
International Reaction
the Iranians are trying to acquire proof of Iraq's use of mustard agent to present to the UN. As Iraqi attacks continue and intensify the chances increase that Iranian forces will acquire a shell containing mustard agent and with Iraqi markings. Tehran would take such evidence to the UN and charge US complicity in violating international law.
No international outcry against Iraq is likely unless Iran secures firm evidence of Iraq's widescale use of chemical agents. Even then, the international community is unlikely to employ economic or political sanctions against Iraq after failing to institute them against the USSR for using chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Any publicity about Iraq's widespread use of chemical weapons could setback recent efforts to strengthen Iraqi-US ties depending on the position taken by the US.
International publicity or condemnation of Iraq for using chemical weapons against Iran is unlikely to cause Baghdad to stop using them. Iraq feels justified in using any weapon to prevent Iran from crossing the border and has been careful to use chemical weapons only in such circumstances.
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